Update: Van Kirk v. State

7 10 2011

The decision didn’t come out this week.  The Arkansas Supreme Court typically does an outstanding job of having a decision published two weeks from submission.  Thursday morning I was on pins and needles awaiting word until I realized the Court didn’t issue a decision in the case.  The Court instead issued an opinion in last week’s civil case.  So if they issue a decision in Van Kirk next week they can still keep their two week average for decisions intact.  Now I just speculate on what it means that they are taking longer.  My guess is that there is a dissent or concurring opinion being circulated.  At least that will make the issue more interesting if there is a split.  It’s always enjoyable to read a passionate dissent in which the dissenter picks apart the fallacies in the majority’s opinion.  Now I’m even more excited about the opinion because even if I have lost I may have convinced one of the seven justices.  We shall see…for all I know it could be an uneventful 7-0 decision.





State Wins 3-0

7 10 2011

Well another week at the Court of Appeals means another set of victories for the State.  This week there were only three criminal cases decided and I have to admit there is no room to disagree on these decisions.

In Conley v. State there were some decent sufficiency arguments advanced concerning an alleged delivery of controlled substance.  The argument could have had some teeth based on the failure of the officers to really identify Conley or his vehicle because of the rain.  Additionally, the audio recording did not have any incriminating statements.  Unfortunately, counsel failed to make specific enough motions for directed verdict and consequently the Court of Appeals can’t address the argument.  As a side note, the best case for insufficient evidence in a delivery case is Donnie Ray Slater v. State.

Fischer v. State was an Anders brief.

Johnson v. State involved a probation revocation.  The arguments on appeal were the failure to hold the hearing within 60 days and the failure to notify the defendant of the violations.  The Court of Appeals held that these arguments were waived because they were not argued before the lower court.





Court of Appeals: Weekly Wins for the State

30 09 2011

Only five criminal appeals were decided this week in the Arkansas Court of Appeals.

In Henry Hampton, Hampton entered a conditional guilty plea and filed an appeal of the circuit court’s denial of the motion to suppress.  Issue involved obtaining a search warrant where officers conducted two controlled buys at Hampton’s residence and officers monitored the residence throughout the buys.  Challenge was made on the failure to establish the reliability of the confidential information; however, the Court found that where the officers can attest to their personal observations of the buy there is no need for the reliability of the informant to be established.

Patrick Davis was charged with theft of property after the victim called 911, police pulled over the described vehicle, the items were located in the vehicle, and the victim identified the man and items.  First, a sufficiency of the evidence challenge that Davis was the thief and to the finding that the value of the property was over $500.  The victim identified Davis and he was found with all of the stolen items so that was clearly a non-issue.  Also, the victim testified as to how much he paid for the pool cues and bag (which appears he takes it very very seriously or got ripped off), which provides sufficient evidence of the value.  The other issues were rejected as either harmless (surprising I know) or for failure to object at trial.

Shena Howard had one good lesson in it.  I’ll go ahead and make the tip of the week coming from this week.  This is an easy one.  Failure to request an admonition of the jury negates a mistrial motion.  Weaver v. State, 324 Ark. 290, 300, 920 S.W.2d 491, 496 (1996).  Defense counsel made an objection at sentencing and asked for a mistrial; however, counsel did not ask for an admonition of the jury.  Therefore, the Court of Appeals did not address the motion for a mistrial.

William Phillips was my case and it was a simple sufficiency challenge.  Phillips got 28 years on second-degree murder and didn’t want to risk a new trial and a greater sentence so we only appealed the sufficiency of the evidence. 

Cameka Sullivan also had an interesting ruling in it.  Sullivan was charged with permitting the abuse of a minor because she knew about her boyfriend’s abuse of her 2 year old but did nothing about it.  The abuse was not alleged to be sexual; however, Sullivan was required to register as a sex offender.  Sullivan challenged the order requiring her to register because it was not a sex offense.  The Court noted that permitting the abuse of a minor is listed under the definition of “sex offense.”





Ira Gene Van Kirk v. State of Arkansas

23 09 2011

Yesterday, I had oral argument at the Arkansas Supreme Court in Van Kirk v. State.  The only issue addressed was whether the confrontation clause applies at sentencing.  The case can be summed up briefly.  Van Kirk pled guilty to 3 counts of rape.  The State and Van Kirk agreed to a jury sentencing.  The State played a video of the victim’s interview with the investigator on the case.  Van Kirk objected that the video violates his confrontation clause rights.  The trial judge ruled that the rules of evidence do not apply to sentencing proceedings nor do they apply to victim impact testimony.  Van Kirk was given 3 consecutive life sentences.

The most notable event occurred when Justice Corbin asked if there was harmless error and I retorted that the State did not make that argument in the brief and I would hope this Court would hold to its case law and not make arguments for either party.  Justice Corbin and a few of the other Justices had a good chuckle at that one.  Generally, the Justices seemed very interested and it certainly made for a hot bench.  It was clear that several of the Justices had a preconceived notion of how to avoid addressing the issue and ruling on harmless error, waiver, failure to preserve, etc.

I’ll give a Justice by Justice recap of the argument.

Justice Baker – Asked one question, “Why didn’t Van Kirk just subpoena the victim?”  It was a good one that certainly took me by surprise in rebuttal.  I answered that he shouldn’t have to subpoena a State’s witness because he should be allowed to cross-examine her.  However, I admitted all prejudice would be lost if he had subpoened her. As the saying goes, “There’s the speech I planned to give, the one I gave, and the one I think of driving home.”  I certainly should have remarked that he hardly could have anticipated not being able to cross-examine the victim at sentencing since every trial court in Arkansas allows for it.

Justice Gunter – Asked only one memorable question to the State, “Doesn’t Mr. Short make a logical policy argument for the application of the confrontation clause?”  I not only appreciated this question but the State found it to be a difficult one to answer.  To be honest I think it was difficult to answer because the policy reasons do support its application.

Justice Corbin – Easily the most active member of the bench.  He questioned me repeatedly on whether Van Kirk waived his right to confrontation (b/c Van Kirk said he would not object if the interview were read to the jury but would object to it being played as a video) and about whether it was harmless error.  He equally found the State’s position that the confrontation clause only applies in cases where the jury is fact-finding at sentencing to increase the possible range of punishment to be meritless absent a policy reason to support it.  Justice Corbin seemed to greatly appreciate policy reasons to support argument and not meaningless case citations.  Also, I must note, Justice Corbin gratiously complimented the quality of the oral argument before the Court.

Chief Justice Hannah – Asked a moderate amount of questions.  The highlight with Justice Hannah was his question of whether Van Kirk preserved his objection under the Arkansas Constitution.  Justice Hannah surely wanted me to concede that he did not.  At trial the objection was simply that it violated the confrontation clause.  There was admittedly no specification of whether it was the state or federal confrontation clause nor were there two separate rulings.  However, my argument was that it was unfair for the State to get to pick which one he was objecting under; instead, it should be preserved under each.  It wasn’t my strongest answer but it simply wasn’t a concession I was willing to make and it was a decision I made well in advance.

Justice Brown – Seemed very concerned with federal law on the issue and wanted to find out if there was a case directly on point.  Unfortunately, there is not.  Justice Brown did ask where the line should be drawn and if I was only asking that the confrontation clause applies to testimony or to documents as well.  I not only said that it applied to it all but that I was advocating that the confrontation clause should be applied to judge sentencing hearings as well.  I wasn’t going to leave the Court with an arbitrarily drawn line.  Instead, I argued that if it would violate the confrontation clause at trial then it should violate the confrontation clause at sentencing.

Justice Danielson – Very concerned about one issue: whether Van Kirk should have just objected to improper victim impact testimony.  I wasn’t positive how it was improper nor was I certain why it was so important but I could tell it was very important to him.  I told him that certainly a hearsay objection would have been the best objection but it wasn’t made.  I said that we are fortunate that it wasn’t because now this Court has the opportunity to address the confrontation clause issue.  I have a feeling he is going to find a way to find the confrontation clause inapplicable at sentencing because he believes there will always be a “better” objection out there.

Justice Henry – She was more active than times in the past.  She pointed out that the right of confrontation is only given to “accused” and after a guilty plea one is no longer “accused.”  My argument in response was that he is still being accused of some things he didn’t plead to, and more importantly, the other Sixth Amendment rights still apply. 

All in all it wasn’t the greatest performance by myself but the Justices were as informed, active, and interested as one could possibly hope for.  Their level of interest and probing questioning created a very intense and exciting oral argument.  I could not thank them more for the respect they showed me and my argument throughout.  I do not think they will rule in my favor because to do so would be to break new ground but I do feel like my client has fully had his day in court.





Another Week Without a Reversal!?!?

23 09 2011

The Court of Appeals has another week consisting of zero criminal reversals.  There were 8 criminal cases with 1 being rejected for failure to include the jury verdict form or order for extension of time to file the record (Goldsberry), 3 based on revocation appeals (Grissom, Jones, Miller), 1 for failing to properly appeal within the time limitations from District to Circuit Court (Risner), 1 involving an unpreserved ineffectiveness claim (Stevenson), and 2 others with some merit.

In Halliday, the Court of Appeals dealt with 2 sufficiency challenges and a Wicks challenge for an incorrect jury instruction on a lesser included offense.  The appellant was convicted of Sexual Assault in the First Degree.  The State used the theory that the appellant was in a position of trust or authority over the victim.  In affirming, the Court noted that the victim stated that she trusted the appellant and her father also said he trusted the appellant.  The problem with the opinion is that the Court has once again punted at defining “position of trust and authority.”  The statute does not say that someone trusted the appellant, but rather, that he must be in a position of trust or authority.  I think this is a very important difference the Court fails to account for; nevertheless, the evidence may be sufficient regardless of the interpretation used.  Additionally, the appellant was convicted of sexual indecency with a minor based upon a different timeframe of alleged sexual assault.  There were two problems with this conviction.  First, sexual indecency requires solicitation.  The victim and appellant testified that except for their first sexual encounter (well prior to the timeframe alleged), the victim had initiated each sexual encounter afterwards.  Therefore, there was no evidence the appellant solicited any sexual encounter during the timeframe alleged.  Second, the next challenge was under a Wicks exception based on instructing the jury of sexual indecency of a minor when it is not a lesser-included offense to sexual assault in the first degree.  Obviously, this was not worthy of a Wicks exception but it makes for good grounds for a Rule 37 Petition.  Although, the Court of Appeals would not even admit that sexual indecency isn’t a lesser-included even though it requires multiple elements that sexual assault in the first degree does not.

The next case of some import was Porter.  Appellant was convicted of delivery of constrolled substances on two separate occasions.  Testimony for the State included the CI and officers involved in the buys.  Appellant took the stand in his own defense and stated that he only sold drugs once.  The State impeached him with his prior convictions for delivery of a controlled substanced.  Appellant objected when the State asked if the two prior offenses and current offenses were “for the same thing.”  The Court of Appeals declined to say whether this was improper questioning (although it is) and instead rested its decision on the failure to show prejudice, overwhelming evidence, and curative instruction given.





Tip of the Week: Argue Cumulative Error to the Trial Court

14 09 2011

Often on appeal attorneys want to rebut the assertions of harmless error and failure to show prejudice by listing all of the trial court’s errors and claiming that as a whole the trial was unfair and the defendant was prejudiced.  It is a common sense argument and one that can be successful.  However, while attorneys object to each and everyone one of the errors at trial individually, they fail to object to the cumulative effect of the errors and get a ruling from the trial court.  Without an objection to the cumulative effect of the errors the argument cannot be advanced on appeal.  See Munson v. State, 331 Ark. 41, 959 S.W.2d 391 (1998).





Clean Sweep for the State

14 09 2011

Today at the Court of Appeals the State won all 10 criminal appeals.  The issues were 6 sufficiency challenges, 1 Anders brief, and 3 other challenges.  The only decisions that really merit any discussion at all were McElroy and Armstrong

In McElroy, the appellant challenged the latitude given to the Prosecutor in voir dire to essentially fact qualify the jury.  While the Court of Appeals would have affirmed regardless, the appellant failed to preserve the argument when he both failed to ask for any admonitions or relief on objection and stated that the jury was acceptable for the defense.  The appellant cannot challenge the voir dire if he then accepts the jury as satisfactory.  See Davis v. State, 365 Ark. 634, 232 S.W.3d 476 (2006).

In Armstrong, the appellant challenged the sufficiency of the evidence in that the accomplice’s testimony was not sufficiently corroborated.  However, the argument was not preserved because the directed verdict motion below was not on this basis.  The lesson is to make sure the directed verdict motions are specific to each and every lesser-included, each element, and each basis that will be challenged on appeal.





Tip of the Week: Speak Fast or Forever Hold Your Objection

7 09 2011

As an appellate attorney it is helpful to constantly remind the trial attorneys how to properly preserve arguments so the courts of appeal will consider them.  The first tip should be known to all but gets even seasoned attorneys coming and going.

To preserve a point for review, a proper objection must be made at the first opportunity after the matter to which the objection has been made occurs.  Asher v. State, 303 Ark. 202, 795 S.W.2d 350 (1990) is often cited for the contemporaneous objection rule and for good reason.  In Asher, the State was asking the appellant’s wife if her bedroom had a fake wall with firearms located behind the wall.  The first question asked was if the wife was in possession of stolen guns in a fake wall in her home.  She answered “not to my knowledge.”  The State then asked her whether she had knowledge of the fake wall with guns behind it.  She answered “no.”  After the second question and answer trial counsel properly objected to the questions and asked for a mistrial.  The judge, and Arkansas Supreme Court, found that the proper time to object was BEFORE the first question was answered.

Objections need to come out immediately.  Therefore, if you miss it the first time around you have just waived your right to appeal the objectionable question or statement.  So for all of us appellate attorneys out there:  be quick and be correct!  (or we’ll mock you behind your back)





Court of Appeals Makes it 2 in a Row

7 09 2011

Another set of Wednesday decisions and the Court of Appeals issued 4 criminal decisions and all four were affirmations of the trial court.  In all fairness the decisions were all extremely easy sufficiency challenges.  Hopefully next week they will end the streak and rule one for the defense.

Changing gears, this blog will start issuing a tip of the week and a past decision of the week.  The decision might be one that was extremely well written, very important, worthy of some rethinking, or just easy to criticize.





Affirmed

31 08 2011

It was the theme of the day over at the Court of Appeals today:  Affirmed.  The Court did not reverse any cases this week.  This is their first week of decisions after the summer hiatus.  The Court probably decided to get the easiest decisions out-of-the-way this week as they get back into the swing of things.  They handled a few easy sufficiency arguments today in Cash and Evans

The only substantive decision today was in Kellar.  In Kellar the appellant argued that a misdemeanor conviction was erroneously allowed into evidence during his sentencing hearing.  Appellant argued that he was not represented by counsel in the misdemeanor case; therefore, it could not be allowed into evidence.  The Court of Appeals ruled that it was not being admitted to prove an habitual allegation; therefore, whether the appellant was represented by counsel was irrelevant.